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The (re)production of publicness 




Internetization probably represents the greatest transformation in communica-
tion technology since the invention of the alphabet and writing. For the fi rst time 
in history, the mutual determinacy of publicness and privateness has been mate-
rialized within a single technological platform. The unprecedented growth of 
public, private and hybrid modes of communication on the web and in social 
media indicates that the internet use can signifi cantly infl uence the future of 
publicness, privateness, and political processes at large. The article discusses 
new modes of relationship developed in the integrated public-private communi-
cation networks (IPPCN), such as privacity and publicy, and new avenues for 
the formation of the IPPCN-based publics.
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Internatization and liquefaction of society
The development of global digital interconnectivity powered by the internet – a 
process I term “internetization”2 – probably represents the greatest transformation 
in communication technology since the invention of the alphabet and writing, which 
marked the transition from barbarism to civilization. Internetization denotes not 
only the interactivity of the global communication infrastructure with its con-
tinuous technological innovations, but also a series of new social and cultural 
phenomena challenging traditional hierarchies and boundaries in society. Today, 
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integrated communications provide a unifi ed user interface and user experience 
across multiple communication channels inside a single platform, and integrate real-
time and non-real-time communications (e.g. an individual can send a message on 
one medium and receive it on another one at any point of time). They expand per-
sonal contacts, presence and mobility capacities to all devices a person has at his or 
her disposal and thus create the Integrated Public-Private Communication Network 
(IPPCN).
IPPCNs are created along the lines of cultural and political interests, generational 
affi nities and specifi c issues within and across regional, national, and supranational 
boundaries, entangled in economic power relations and governmental structures. 
They are fundamentally reshaping the nature of work and economy worldwide. The 
production and (productive) consumption of huge amounts of information and data 
as the most important resource, “the new oil” of the 21st century, raise “fundamental 
questions about privacy, property, global governance, human rights” and demand “a 
new way of thinking about individuals” (WEF, 2011: 5; see also Rubinstein, 2013). 
IPPCN opens new avenues in the (re)production of public and private life, including 
public opinion, the public sphere, and protection of privacy, and challenges social 
scientists to reconsider democratic potentials of (new) communication technolo-
gies.
One could (mistakenly) believe that internetization is not a new phenomenon 
only by underestimating the multiple ways in which all aspects of human life, 
from the workplace to education, leisure and politics, are affected on global 
scale by the omnipresence of the internet. Internetization has transformed com-
munication processes with consequences that affect online and offl ine univers-
es, private and public environments, to weave them inextricably together in the 
“liquid-modern society” (Bauman, 2015). The internet has reduced the time-
space distance between places linked into it to zero and decreased the amount of 
time required to conduct social exchanges. Moreover, it has been completely 
integrated with the ‘pre-internet’ modes of activities, to the degree that the sense 
of its distinction from the ways we traditionally get things done has largely dis-
appeared.
Communication technologies have always produced ambivalent consequences for 
individuals and societies, each an “expansion of men’s powers to learn and to ex-
change ideas and experiences” and “a new opportunity for a new method of govern-
ment or a new opportunity for trade” (Williams, 1962/1976: 10). Since the advent 
of writing, every new communication technology – from print to radio, television 
and the internet – was lauded as the bright beginning of a new era, and criticized that 
it would destroy the glories of the past culture. All new communication technologies 
were seen as potentially democratic, because they could reduce the cost and in-
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crease the speed of information dissemination, the number of available communica-
tion channels or media, and possibly content diversity. The internet signifi cantly 
enhanced two other important, potentially democratizing features: helping commu-
nities to stay in touch with each other, and establishing forms of communication that 
transcend boundaries between private and public, interpersonal and mass communi-
cation (Arterton, 1987: 29-38).
Yet new communication technologies also have the potential of being abused, as 
Williams warns us, for political or commercial ends. The development of IPPCN is 
not an exception. Algorithmic communication tools, the internet of things, smart TV 
and phones, and other smart connected products have not only the potential to en-
hance the colonization of daily life and reinforce institutions of authority – particu-
larly by making user data continually available to the manufacturer and thus invali-
dating the assumed exclusive ownership of the buyer/user –, but also to smudge the 
distinction between human and computer capacities and operations. They generate 
major changes by loosening technological boundaries that once separated the pri-
vate from the public, requiring renegotiations of the meaning of publicness and 
privateness among the people. The permeability of formerly solid boundaries be-
tween specifi c domains of human life regulated by specifi c regimes also raises im-
portant questions of who and how will control these regulatory regimes in the IP-
PCN-based “liquid-modern society.”
Issues of publicness and technologies of control have been central in the develop-
ment of communication technologies since the early newspaper history and fi ghts 
against censorship, and they became ever more important with each advancement in 
communication technologies that followed. They emerged in the very fi rst conceptu-
alizations of the public in the 18th century, closely connected with the social signifi -
cance of the press with its editors and journalists as the “public opinion tribunal” 
(Bentham, 1791). Ever since, mass media have been considered the central pillars of 
the public sphere constitutive to democratic governance, and journalistic discourse a 
specifi c regulatory regime of the public sphere.
Internetization of social and political environments has deeply affected the articula-
tion of the basic critical-normative functions of public communication related to the 
formation of publics and public opinion, once specifi cally attributed to the mass me-
dia. These functions refer to (1) the making visible developments in the socio-politi-
cal environment with important long-term consequences for citizens (as conceptual-
ized by Dewey), (2) providing citizens access to the media needed for their “public 
use of reason” (Kant), (3) conducting surveillance of political and economic rulers 
and legitimizing their decisions (Bentham), and (4) mediating between the rulers and 
the ruled (Marx), acknowledging disagreements and cultivating refl exive publicity. 
They need to be reconceptualized and (re)affi rmed, and adopted by the mass media 
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and new modes of many-to-many communication in order to overcome the contem-
porary democratic defi cit.
An increasing amount and diversity of user- and computer-generated contents – used 
by the media and bypassing the media – challenges these (normative) functions of 
public communication, as the mass media and journalists who ought to (and used to) 
perform them may be facing not only a loss of autonomy in the IPPCN but also the 
demise of the journalistic profession as we used to know it. The breadth of these 
changes is refl ected in the prevailing belief of journalists that they would no longer 
be able to carry out their work without social media, which are also supposed to 
undermine traditional journalistic values (CISION, 2016), and in the news industry 
projection that 75 percent of its content will be robot-created by 2020 (Schaefer, 
2016).
These changes bring us to the question of whether the emancipatory potential of the 
internet-based IPPCN is strong enough to enhance new democratic platforms culti-
vating refl exive publicity, the Kantian “public use of reason?” Or has internetization 
blended publicness and privateness in a way that not only would not allow us to 
reach “the fi nal stage of democracy,” but may also seriously compromise our rights 
and freedoms?
A major feature of internetization is the liquefaction of the boundary between pub-
licness and privateness. With the IPPCN, the relation between privateness and pub-
licness has moved, for the fi rst time in history, from the conceptual to the material: 
the IPPCN links publicness and privateness together directly, inside a single techno-
logical platform. In a platform for both private and public interactions, the differ-
ence is now diffused through the production of hybrid public-private forms of com-
municative actions, situations, actors, and digital intermediaries. By integrating 
private and public communication, the internet has interconnected traditionally 
separated modes of communication (from one-to-one to many-to-many) and types 
of content (text, image, audio, video, and voice) on a global scale. This new world 
of communication, “mass self-communication,” as Castells (2007: 248) calls it, has 
far more signifi cant long-term consequences for individuals and society than any 
other previous revolutionary communication technology. Not only is, what used to 
be called the private sphere, not regarded private anymore. Formerly clearly-demar-
cated boundaries between private and public discussion of personal and collective 
concerns in hierarchically-organized political communication are now porous; even 
the human needs and rights to privacy and free public expression (to act publicly) 
coalesce into each other, as for example in the ‘right of publicity.’
Hitherto distinct boundaries between public and private have become in-
creasingly unstable and bedevilled by ambiguities between fi rst-person expe-
riences and universal concerns. … Previously conceived in terms of linear 
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transmission, the political communication system has become porous, and 
the democratic project, once limited to a clearly delineated ‘public sphere’, 
seeps into innumerable areas of social interaction that cannot be easily cat-
egorised as public or non-public, political or non-political (Coleman, 2017: 
59–60).
Immense technological and social changes in the period of globalization also chal-
lenge the explanatory power and validity of theorizations of privateness and public-
ness historically rooted in entirely different social and technological conditions. 
There is a need to reconceptualize the traditional concepts of publicness and pri-
vateness to fully capture changes in the public and private modes of relationships 
among people created in and by internetization, and to explore the affordances of 
IPPCN to increase people’s political engagement and develop participatory forms 
of political democracy.
Publicness and privateness fi gure as “basic notions” of social life (Dewey, 1927: 
12–13). The idea that “there are things that need to be hidden and others that need 
to be displayed publicly if they are to exist at all” (Arendt, 1989: 73) is universal 
and transcends cultural boundaries.3 The distinction between publicness and 
privateness should be considered “the great dichotomy,” according to Bobbio 
(1989: 1), because it is suitable “for dividing a world into two spheres which 
together are exhaustive” and, at the same time, “mutually exclusive.” Yet the 
idea of mutual exclusivity of publicness and privateness, which seemed irrefu-
table in the pre-digital era, can hardly be justifi ed today. The internet blurred the 
boundary between the two spheres that was consolidated two centuries ago by 
the emergence of the bourgeois public, which was brought about by the new 
technology of printing and clearly separated from the private sphere. Neverthe-
less, maintaining boundaries between the public and private spheres, and enhancing 
their autonomy, remains essential to preserving human freedom and is constitutive 
to democratic governance, both of which are fundamental notions in western politi-
cal thought.
The universality of the concepts ‘publicness’ and ‘privateness’ suggests that the 
distinction between the two concepts cannot be unique to modern societies. 
Throughout human history, culturally, morally, and politically defi ned boundaries 
and interaction between showing and hiding, between visible and invisible, be-
tween external and internal, between disclosure and discretion, between public and 
private have existed at the personal and societal level. This is not to say that the 
social signifi cance of public and private life and the boundaries that separated them 
remained unchanged. Quite to the contrary, in the last two centuries, they have been 
changed signifi cantly, and have been made politically and economically relevant 
mainly due to the emergence of mass media. With the internet, these changes be-
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came even more profound, “a new battleground in modern societies, a contested 
terrain where individuals and organizations wage a new kind of information war, a 
terrain where established relations of power can be challenged and disrupted, lives 
damaged and reputations sometimes lost” (Thompson, 2011: 49).
Publicness and privateness are opposed but complementary to each other, as they 
are both closely linked with actions aiming to control our relationships with others 
by managing information access and visibility thresholds. In Aristotle’s early con-
ceptualization of household (oikos) as the basic social unit and ideal-typical realm 
of privacy opposed to the public domain of political agency (polis), housekeeping 
included duties toward society and imposed by society. Public transactions coexist 
with private ones because they both have, by their very nature, a social component 
(Splichal, 2006; 2016b). The quintessential difference between publicness and pri-
vateness is, following Dewey’s distinction between the public and private, based on 
the perceived consequences of social transactions rather than specifi c qualities of a 
situation or personal motives (Splichal, 2016a). A transaction is private if its conse-
quences are confi ned to only those directly engaged; if the consequences extend 
beyond those directly involved, the transaction is by its very nature public (Dewey, 
1927/1991: 12ff). When transactions have long-term and important consequences 
for those not directly involved, there arises a need to establish regulatory and con-
trolling mechanisms and institutions, eventually the state – in contrast to privacy 
that does not need any external regulatory mechanisms, but necessitates privacy 
actions and public protection but did not need, until recently, any external regula-
tion. The social bond between publicness and privateness is so strong that it is often 
diffi cult to identify strictly private human actions in the sense that (1) the conse-
quences of interpersonal transactions are controlled entirely by those directly in-
volved and (2) no direct or indirect consequences whatsoever of ‘private’ actions 
would affect other people.
Publicness refers to a specifi c quality or “mode of relationship among people” (Cal-
houn, 2013: 72) based on transparency, visibility and access, being in the sight of 
observers, made to be (or can be) seen, heard, or accessed by everyone, or at least 
by many. The public, public sphere and publicity are essential for collective self-
understanding processes and constitutive to democratically organized societies. 
Publicity (re)produces connectivity, which makes it constitutive of publics and the 
public sphere, and thus essential for any conceptualization of democracy, particu-
larly deliberative democracy. The communication infrastructure and its social or-
ganization (public or private, for-profi t or non-commercial service, etc.) defi ne con-
ditions and ways of access (who can communicate with whom), modes of access 
(audio, video), and modes of communication (from one-to-one to many-to-many). 
As Dewey (1927: 114) argued, “technology employed so as to facilitate the rapid 
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and easy circulation of opinions and information, and so as to generate constant and 
intricate interaction far beyond the limits of face-to-face communities” was the 
main enabler of “modern state-unity.”
The development and social use of communication infrastructure are culturally, po-
litically, legally and economically regulated, coordinated and eventually even cen-
sored, for political or commercial purposes. “What is allowed to become public and 
what is kept private in any given transaction will depend on what needs to be taken 
into collective consideration for the purposes of the transaction and what would, on 
the contrary, disrupt it if introduced into the public space” (Nagel, 2002: 12). The 
question of ‘What’ is directly related to the question of ‘Who’: Who is in control of 
politics of visibility? Who decides on what has to be seen and what has to be put out 
of public sight?
Contemporary controversies around the relationship between the new communica-
tion infrastructure and possibilities for participation in public communication com-
mitted to the public good are rooted in the Dewey-Lippmann debate on the nature, 
competences, legitimacy and effi cacy of ‘the public’ in 1920s. Many studies have 
advanced Dewey’s idea of “the public” (Dryzek, 2010, Jacobs et al., 2009, Cham-
bers, 2012, Keane, 2013, Calhoun, 2013, Coleman, 2017). However, despite an im-
mense potential of publicity attributed to the internet, concerns about limitations to 
the democratic potential of publicness and publics persist, but there is hardly any 
discussion how to overcome them.
Privateness, on the other hand, refers to what is hidden, confi dential, invisible to 
others and only restrictively accessible. Privacy provides the space that protects and 
makes the individual fi t to appear in the public realm. Moreover, privacy is a neces-
sary condition for an individual to exist as a human being. Being human implies 
singularity and commonality, individuality and sociability, privateness and public-
ness, which are all constitutive of human nature and dignity. Without privacy, our 
lives would resemble the life of slaves and serfs, who were afforded little or no 
privacy; the places they lived (which they were not allowed to own) and their per-
sonal belongings, even their lives themselves were constantly under the eyes of their 
owners and masters, and thus utterly dehumanized.
On the other hand, privacy may also have negative implications. Under the veil of 
privacy, domination, exploitation, violence, tyranny, censorship and other abuses of 
power, unlawful and unethical activities in families, corporations and organizations 
can be kept away from public monitoring and sanctions. There were good reasons 
why Bentham considered privacy “one of the most mischievously effi cient instru-
ments of despotism,” and required that “on no occasion to give to privacy any extent 
beyond what the particular nature of the occasion absolutely requires” (Bentham, 
1812/1843: 28).
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Traditionally, privacy was (regarded as) natural – “as a given bedrock or substratum 
of taken-for-granted experiences and meanings” (Keane 2013, 33) – and technolo-
gy-free: no particular technology was needed for hiding oneself temporarily from 
others, e.g. protecting oneself from public gaze or state interference in one’s private 
lodging. Neither of that is true anymore. If in the past, “the four walls of one’s pri-
vate property offered the only reliable hiding place from the common public world, 
not only from everything that goes on in it, but also from its very publicity, from 
being seen and being heard” (Arendt, 1989: 71), those times have defi nitively ended 
with the internet, if not even long before.
Privacy does not imply social isolation. It is (re)produced in a broader value system 
that regulates social behavior. In Aristotle’s conceptualization of oikos, “human be-
ings should conceive privacy not as a sphere that should (at best) accommodate 
common opinion, but as activities that cultivate virtue and discount common opin-
ion” (Swanson, 1992: 7, emphasis added; see also Calhoun, 2013). While often also 
closely related to ‘suspicious’ secrecy, privacy is considered a safeguard of indi-
viduals and societies against arbitrary and unjustifi ed use of power and “a necessary 
condition for democracy” (Boehme Nessler, 2016: 222). The right and moral obli-
gation of journalists – professional intermediaries between publicness and private-
ness – to protect privacy of their sources and conceal their identities as professional 
secrecy, perhaps best indicate how precious privacy is also for public life. Without 
keeping a source’s identity private, not only would their personal fate be endan-
gered, but also important stories would be kept out of the eyes of the public.
New modes of relationship: privacity and publicy
By folding publicness into privateness, and privateness into publicness, internetiza-
tion made the traditional borderline between once clearly separated circles of pub-
licness and privateness increasingly blurry, which problematizes traditional con-
cepts and experiences of publicness and privateness. It has become common that 
our relationships with other people are only rarely marked by private face-to-face 
interactions and ‘normally’ take place in the IPPCN-environment. Even our interac-
tions with the physical world are often IPPCN-mediated, with remote cameras and 
microphones, GPS navigation utilities, sensors and interfaces, autonomous vehicles 
and other digitally conveyed ‘extensions’ of human bodies and faculties. New pri-
vate/public environments are being created, making it necessary to reconsider and 
reconceptualize not only privateness and publicness but many of the most basic 
categories related to them in social sciences, such as ‘mass communication’, ‘mass 
media’, ‘interpersonal communication’, ‘social network’, or ‘advertising’ and 
‘propaganda’.
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Whereas for centuries, personal privacy was seen as a feature that simply existed 
and could be taken for granted (but it was commonly agreed that it deserved some 
protection), now it is something we need to act on behalf of, to create and to have, 
as for example to control access to our (meta)data (Jensen & Helles, 2017: 23). For 
more than two centuries, publicity and the public (and more recently the public 
sphere) were ‘the stars’ of academic disputes and normative regulations to enhance 
and protect public communication, whereas privacy was kept in the shadow. Now it 
seems that almost the opposite is the case. As Jeff Jarvis observed, “It used to be that 
publicity had to be paid-for. Soon, privacy may have to be paid-for.”4
The controversial conceptualizations of the public-private relationship resulting 
from the emergence of the privacy issues can be perhaps best exemplifi ed with the 
recent discussions of the ‘right of publicity.’ The right of publicity was conceptual-
ized by Judge Jerome Frank in 1953 to distinguish the right of publicity from other 
privacy rights by focusing on the economic interests involved, as opposed to per-
sonal interests characteristic of the right to privacy, and fi rst enacted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1977 (Faber, 2015). Yet the concept is often misinterpreted, part-
ly because its (legal) defi nition and recognition vary from country to country, and 
partly because the term misleadingly alludes to publicness rather than privateness. 
The right of publicity is conceived of as the right of individuals to control the use of 
their personal names, images, likenesses, and other facets of one’s identity, and be-
ing protected against their commercial exploitation without permission or compen-
sation (but not necessarily against the use for public purposes). It is mostly not 
considered a ‘personal right’ but rather a kind of property right, so that its validity 
can survive the death of the person involved (‘postmortem right of publicity’). 
However, the right of publicity is not only the right to profi t from your own identity; 
it also implies the protection of individuals against the privacy intrusion (intrusion 
upon physical solitude; public disclosure of private facts) and the ‘right to a good 
name’ (against depiction in a false light and misappropriation of name and likeness). 
In effect, the right of publicity protects material and immaterial private property and 
personal privacy.
Controversies on the right of publicity arise from the fact that it is a Janus-faced 
right: it binds in a relation two – private and public – domains and actions, referring 
to the (violation of) personal privacy right, private property right, and instrumental 
publicity. The reference to publicity is focused on a specifi c activity – named ‘pub-
licity’ – in which a private condition or state is made public. This kind of publicity 
is usually aimed at promoting private interests in public and thus instrumental rath-
er than refl exive. Yet even so, the substance of the right of publicity is not in public-
ity but in (preventing) actions that invade privacy by making private conditions 
public without the authorization of private person(s) affected, which brings privacy 
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invasions close – in principle – to enslavement. In essence, the right of publicity 
protects material and immaterial private property and personal (but also corporate) 
privacy; it does not endorse or protect publicness, but it does ‘publicy’.
To address these Janus-faced actions and their contradictory consequences, I pro-
pose introducing two new concepts, publicy and privacity (cf. Table 1) to grasp the 
smooth passages from privateness to publicness and vice versa. Such passages are 
not entirely new phenomena. Opinion polls ‘magically’ transform anonymous pri-
vate opinions into ‘public opinion’ (Splichal, 2012b). In his largely forgotten essay 
on public opinion published in 1940, Tom Harrisson saw the British pub as a place 
where “private opinions emerged as public opinions.” Likewise, we can think of the 
internet as a ‘digital pub’, as a hub potentially interconnecting not only private and 
public opinions but expressions of all forms of ‘holding for true’ (Führwahrhalten) 
– opining, believing and knowing (Kant, 1781/1952: 241) – as well as (subjective 
and objective) doubts. The ‘digital pub’ is less like the old neighborhood pub in this 
respect: the need to risk expressing opinion dissolves into fl eeting likes and dislikes, 
expands into societal and transnational symbolic engagements although, in some 
countries, this activity occurs at the peril of personal safety and even existence.
Table 1.  Four main conceptual dimensions of liquefaction 
of the public-private dichotomy
Agency publicity privacity
Principal actor the public individual
Quality publicness privateness
Situation, condition publicy privacy
We need the words ‘publicy’5 and ‘privacity,’ however awkward they are, to indi-
cate new modes of relationship among people, new modes of agency and new ven-
ues of communication brought about by IPPCNs, which are neither strictly public 
nor strictly private. Technology and economics assisted people to form new kinds of 
communities – political, economic, or cultural; material and imagined – that go 
beyond the face-to-face communication and personal transactions but are not en-
tirely public. In a personal public-private communication network built in the ‘sec-
ond universe’ of the IPPCN, the people we connect with are seen as members of a 
community, and this community belongs to the one who created it – the internet 
user. In contrast, in a community of the ‘fi rst universe,’ in Gemeinschaft as Tönnies 
defi ned it, the opposite is the case: individuals belong to ‘their’ community; they are 
subjugated to it.
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If ‘privacy’ indicates specifi c conditions in which a person does not allow being ob-
served or disturbed by other people (such as in personal ‘right to privacy’), it is im-
portant to complement this character with ‘publicy,’ a newly emerging situation in 
which a person allows or invites other people to engage in a ‘community’ that (s)he 
has established online. Complementary to privacy in the sense of being alone, pub-
licy refers to what Bauman (2015) described as a “collection of loners who are never 
alone” because they are always connected. It is still the domain of one’s undivided 
sovereignty, but it is widely open to external gaze – a personal quasi-public or “proto-
public” (Splichal, 2012a), in an “area of social interaction that cannot be easily cat-
egorized as public or non-public” (Coleman, 2017: 60). Internet users often express 
themselves more openly in ‘publicy’ than in the traditionally separated public and 
private domains as a consequence of the online disinhibition effect created by disso-
ciative anonymity, invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative 
imagination, and minimization of authority (Suler, 2004: 321). These new areas of 
private publicness and public privateness are the places where the bulk of contempo-
rary online interactions occur. They are based on limited transparency, visibility and 
access – certainly meant to be seen, heard, or accessed by many, but not by everyone. 
Yet this new mode of many-to-many communication does not help to overcome the 
contemporary democratic defi cit; even the contrary may be the case.
At the time when privacy is losing its attractiveness or is even being declared dead 
(“You have zero privacy anyway – get over it!”6), it is particularly important to 
complement ‘publicity’ with ‘privacity,’ referring to actions creating privacy and 
privateness. Two types of action-making, publicity and privacity, address the doubly 
refl exive character of internetization. The fi rst is captured by a familiar term – pub-
licity, which means the making of the private public (e.g. expressing private opinion 
in public or providing public surveillance), acting to attract public attention or (re)
creating publicness. Its opposite – and complementary in terms of the two spheres 
which together are exhaustive – is privacity, or counter-publicity, which signifi es 
actions of autonomous individuals toward cultivating, (re)creating and protecting 
intimacy, domesticity, and the space of individuality, aimed to control their self-
presentation and protect themselves against arbitrary use of power. As publicity 
produces publicy, privacity produces and maintains privacy.
Privacity typically involves actions intended to conceal (parts of) identity in order 
to attain and protect one’s privacy – in contrast to culturally imposed invisibility. 
“Hidden in plain sight, under the radar, or behind the scenes are people who strategi-
cally choose to conceal parts of their identity, their locations, or their life situation. 
Strategic invisibility resists an oppressive environment by disengaging from it until 
new possibilities arise” (Lollar, 2015: 298).
While originally conceptualized by Kant as the public use of reason, and constitu-
tive of the public for Bentham, publicity later dissolved into any form of attracting 
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public attention for ideas, individuals, organizations, artefacts, goods and services, 
to become (almost) synonymous with promotion, advertising, or propaganda. Simi-
larly to instrumental publicity generating “representative publicness” (Habermas) 
through propaganda, advertising, and public relations, privacity also includes in-
strumental actions suppressing the potentially public, which can even extend to the 
unmaking of the public back into the private (e.g. personalized computational prop-
aganda substituting traditional mass propaganda, or protection of corporate priva-
cy). Emancipatory forms of publicity and privacity largely remain normative ideals; 
in practice, instrumental forms prevail. Table 2 presents instances of emancipatory 
and instrumental modes of publicity and privacity.




Publicity information dissemination, deliberation propaganda, advertising, PR
Privacity
control of self-presentation 




protection of corporate privacy
The two types of agency, publicity and privacity, are performed by either individual 
or collective (including corporate) actors. The qualities they generate are – as yin 
and yang – distinguished by actual visibility or circulation – publicness – and invis-
ibility or covertness – privateness. Privateness exists under conditions and situa-
tions for which the term, privacy is commonly used. Nowadays, the situation of 
privacy with its quality of privateness amounts to “something that we must act on to 
get back, rather than something we attain or retain by mere default”; this leads to the 
personal(ized) venue of public life, publicy, as “the new default” (NetLawMedia, 
2012). Privacy is becoming a condition of latency, even marginality, overshadowed 
by acts of publicity that generate publicy, the personalized opposite of privacy (in 
contrast to the genuinely public “public sphere”). “Everything private is now done, 
potentially, in public – and is potentially available for public consumption. … The 
private is public, to be celebrated and consumed by countless ‘friends’ as well as 
casual ‘users’” (Bauman and Lyon, 2013: 25, 19).
Yet neither privacy nor publicy assume given and complete conditions, but have to 
be permanently worked for. We can see both publicity and privacity more often 
managed by the non-principal resource- and powerful actors (commercial groups 
and political agents) than indigenous actors who alone can reproduce publicness 
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and privateness. Habermas’ distinction between the loosely organized actors who 
“emerge from the public and take part in the reproduction of the public sphere it-
self,” and much more resource- and powerful actors who “occupy an already con-
stituted public domain in order to use it,” thus merely “appearing before the public” 
to manipulate it (1992/1997: 375), also applies to priva(cit)y. Instrumental modes of 
privacity managed by corporations to protect ‘corporate privacy’ prevail over eman-
cipatory (re)creation of personal privacy.
New avenues for the IPPCN-based publics: 
from newsworthiness to public-worthiness
Publicity, the mode of activity, and publicness, the quality of relationship, are inte-
gral to the constitution of publics and the public sphere. Publicy, the new phenom-
enon in the online universe is not a public and even less so a/the public sphere, yet 
it is directly linked to them. It refers to newly emerging situations in which a person 
allows or invites other people to engage in a ‘community’ that (s)he has established 
in the online universe. It is a kind of semi-public extension of privacy – more like a 
club than a pub – potentially connecting publicy with publics in the public sphere. 
In contrast, the public normatively refers to the collective subject of (all) individuals 
interested in, and discursively connected to follow and discuss some issue with im-
portant long-term consequences for a signifi cant number of people. It is constituted 
by cooperative efforts of its members to bring about the commonly desired regula-
tion of consequences.
At present, the internet’s emancipatory power of creating new democratic platforms 
and fostering refl exive publicity or the Kantian “public use of reason” remains ques-
tionable. Internetization has enabled privatization of publicness and publicization of 
privacy in a way that may seriously compromise citizen rights and freedoms. Infor-
mation abundance spurring processes of fragmentation and one-sided cognitive 
consonance tends to reduce opportunities for testing reliability of our knowledge 
and opinions. Monologues in fact-deprived and private digital rallies in fragmented 
pseudo publics prevail over stimulating discussion and conversation in the public 
sphere. Web communities, which shoot up like mushrooms after the rain in the 
 internet, hardly transcend group particularisms based on ethnic, racial, gender, age, 
ideological, religious, professional, and other identities, partialities and interests. 
The eclipse of consequential, authentic publics – if they ever existed – is exacer-
bated as individual and corporate social network (prod)users (can) apply social 
 access control tools to specify which users or groups of users have access to the 
uploaded content. The (‘big’) data that web users continually provide – in the form 
of clicks, likes, comments, downloads and uploads, shares, search, update status, 
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adding photos, friends, names, and data use permissions granting via apps – are 
tracked and transformed by Web analytics into a product that can be marketized and 
monetized. While customizing their services to users’ tastes and preferences, the 
internetized companies may trap them in the ‘fi lter bubbles’ of like-minded people 
not exposed to information that could challenge or broaden their understanding but 
only to information and opinions reinforcing their preferences. The corporate cap-
ture of the IPPCNs imposes a highly asymmetric exchange advancing corporate 
rather than common interests and limits public debate on the exercise of economic 
power. “Corporations know almost everything about our activities but we know 
 almost nothing about theirs. Disclosure of their strategies and intentions is highly 
selective and carefully massaged by public relations. The bases of the algorithms 
directing user activity are protected by intellectual property regimes and commer-
cial confi dentiality” (Murdock, 2017).
In an attempt to “develop a stronger theoretical grasp of the problems and potential 
of democratic publics,” Calhoun (2013: 103) suggests that we should resist “three 
longings that color many accounts of the public sphere” (which in fact refer both to 
‘the public’ and its infrastructure, the public sphere). “It is not subject to complete 
rational control … It is not possible to make public life an extension of community 
… And publicness cannot be neatly bounded by the limits of a public sphere, be-
cause publicness always has the capacity to transform the public itself.” While ad-
mitting that publics cannot be completely ‘rational,’ and that publicness/publicity 
does not match the public sphere, publicy as an extension of privacy with the capac-
ity to connect with a public can, hypothetically, facilitate and support public par-
ticipation and debate over the issues with important long-term consequences for 
those (to be) involved in debates and beyond.
How publicness, public life, publics (and we should ad, publicy) are seen to be con-
nected with/in the public sphere partly, and perhaps even mainly, depends on how 
these concepts are defi ned. The Habermasian term ‘public sphere’ introduced in the 
English translation of his Strukturwandel is still the source of misunderstandings 
and confusions, equating ‘public(s)’ with ‘public sphere(s)’ (cf. Bruns & Highfi eld, 
2016: 59). In a very usable operationalization of the public, according to Habermas 
(1989: 249), Mills defi ned it in the following way: “In a public … virtually as many 
people express opinions as receive them. Public communications are so organized 
that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion ex-
pressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion readily fi nds an outlet in ef-
fective action, even against – if necessary – the prevailing system of authority. And 
authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less au-
tonomous in its operations” (Mills, 1956: 303–304).7
In Mills’ perspective, the key question is, if/how new communication technologies 
can “facilitate maximum public participation and debate over the key issues” (Kell-
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ner, 2014: 19) effectively? Of the four conditions outlined by Mills, which are es-
sential to deliberative legitimization processes in complex societies, IPPCN can be 
deployed to help solve the issues of inclusiveness and autonomy, but much harder 
the issue of effi cacy. At least in their idealized form, informal networks are sym-
metrical and decentralized, where as many people (can) express opinions as receive 
them, and any opinion expressed can be easily answered back or commented on, so 
that the traditional distinction between communicators (sources) and recipients 
melts down. By providing access to everyone, IPPCN may also be used to address 
the problem of legitimacy (Fraser, 2007), to the degree at least that it provides a 
socio-technological infrastructure for the public sphere in which the rulers and the 
ruled can discursively connect. It can also be employed to enable “citizens and 
whole organizations and networks to sound the alarm whenever they suspect that 
others are causing them harm, or that calamities are bearing down on their heads, in 
silence” (Keane, 2013: 241), which indicates a level of autonomy from authoritative 
institutions. The question remains whether it is possible to develop the existing 
communicative affordances of IPPCN’s to increase the rational potential of publics, 
which is also a necessary condition for the fully fl edged autonomy of publicy and 
publics. The evidence suggests that emancipatory potentials of the internet to create 
new democratic platforms of refl exive publicity inspired by the Kantian “public use 
of reason” are yet to be developed. The development of such platforms would offer 
an opportunity to ‘test’ the old Dewey’s idea that only after secrecy is replaced by 
publicity and methods of communication and education are improved, we will be 
able to tell “how apt for judgment of social policies the existing intelligence of the 
masses may be” (Dewey, 1927/1991: 209).
Contemporary controversies around the relationship between the new commu-
nication infrastructure and possibilities for participation in public communica-
tion committed to the public good remind us of a similar debate almost a hun-
dred years ago about whether the public is just a “phantom” (Lippmann), or if it 
can indeed act (Splichal, 1999). The main issue in that debate was the fate of the 
public – its nature, competences, legitimacy and effi cacy. Lipmann cynically 
called the public a “phantom” and compared it with a “deaf spectator in the back 
row who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite man-
age to keep awake” (Lippmann, 1927: 13). Only experts could fi nd effective 
solutions to problems, but not large-scale publics in public debates. In contrast, 
Dewey considered an actively involved public essential for democracy, as it 
emerges from discussions of important social consequences of transactions among 
individuals who did not take part in them, but were affected by them (Dewey, 
1927/1954: 35). He admitted that the actual performance of publics was below nor-
mative expectations but this was not to say that publics could not get much stronger 
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if “secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ig-
norance are replaced by inquiry and publicity” (Dewey, 1927: 209).
Numerous pre-internet experiments and case studies with – particularly local and 
cable – television were designed to explore the possibility of using communication 
technologies to increase people’s political engagement and develop participatory 
forms of political democracy (Coleman, 2017: 49-51). They included community 
radio, telephone conferencing, televoting, two-way cable TV, which are now all part 
of the integrated public-private communication network based on the internet. The 
common thread running through those studies in the 1970s and 1980s was to con-
sider what forms of political participation could emerge from an imaginative use of 
(new) communication technologies. In essence, they followed Dewey’s (1927: 143) 
claim that, “the idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplifi ed 
in the state even at its best,” which is why we have constantly to return to the idea 
of democracy itself to “criticize and re-make its political manifestations” (Dewey, 
1927: 144). Ideas are decisive, but only as long as they are connected with, and 
validated against specifi c, given and potential historical circumstances, material re-
sources, technological developments, and social and political actors and move-
ments.
Many studies advanced Dewey’s idea of ‘the public’ through an empirical analysis 
of how and where citizens talk, discuss, and deliberate with each other “on public 
issues that affect the communities in which they live” (Jacobs et al., 2009: 3). In 
1988, Fishkin designed the famed “deliberative polling experiment” – a social sci-
ence experiment combined with elements of public education – which has been 
conducted over seventy times in 24 countries by to date (Fishkin, 2009). These stud-
ies were primarily interested in whether citizens are in a position to make informed 
judgments and how they come to their opinions (Chambers, 2012: 56). Findings of 
those studies echo Dewey’s conclusion of 1927 that, “The democratic public is still 
inchoate and not organized.” When addressing the question of what steps can and 
should be taken to bring down the deliberative defi cit, to enhance legitimacy and, 
hopefully, effectiveness of democratic process, Dewey’s “intellectual instrumen-
talities for the formation of an organized public” – better education, distribution of 
knowledge and interpersonal communication – are widely recognized as potentially 
the most effective remedies, but there is hardly any discussion of how and where to 
‘get’ those ‘remedies’.
These issues are as relevant today as they were in the beginning of the 20th century, 
now signifi cantly associated with the internet and the declining trust in traditional 
media, governments, political parties and many other national and transnational in-
stitutions. Despite an immense potential to entice social changes and personal be-
havior attributed to the internet, and beliefs that internetization broadens the venues 
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for communication without restraints, which implies that “democratic politics can 
fl ourish” (Keane, 2013: 221), serious concerns about limitations to the democratic 
potential of publicness and publics, which dominated in the former century, do not 
cease to persist. There are still concerns that the public “cannot quite manage to 
keep awake” (Lippmann) when faced with complex and specialized policy issues, 
and that it is constrained by the commercial and political interests of those in power. 
Whereas Tönnies (1922) conceived of public opinion as a complex form of social 
will in society (Gesellschaft) opposed to religion in community (Gemeinschaft), the 
role of religion in the public sphere today can be compared (and compatible) with 
that of public opinion, not least because they both make the boundary between pub-
licness and privateness permeable. Exciting possibilities of interaction on a larger 
scale and over longer distances, followed by the ideas of transnational public spheres 
and publics, are confronted with a considerable increase in the extent of large-scale 
surveillance and intrusion of privacy. Normative requirements of a public to be a 
legitimate forum for citizens’ deliberation, generating an effi cacious public opinion 
(Fraser, 2007) are also challenged by the processes of globalization. Critics of the 
global democratic defi cit argue that globalization sacrifi ced democratic politics to 
the profi tability of global economic transactions: it shook economic security and 
social equalities, and weakened citizens’ participation in decision-making and dem-
ocratic institutions once established within democratic political systems of nation-
states (Splichal, 2009).
Access to information on transactions with potentially important long-term conse-
quences for those not involved is the fundamental precondition for a public to 
emerge. In the anarchic online environment, citizens have to function as their own 
gatekeepers and editors in order to acquire and disseminate relevant information, 
but many are not able to perform that task, which can even lead to information 
anxiety. Internet users may combine dozens of information and communication util-
ity activities from searching answers to specifi c questions and news to email, open 
forums, blogs and microblogs, chat sites, news groups, and social networking sites. 
It is not only the fl ood of incoming e-mail messages and website updates (‘RSS 
feeds’) that causes personal information overload; it is also the vast ocean of infor-
mation in the world outside, which people feel compelled to explore in order to keep 
updated, and disinformation (‘fake news’) that is hard to distinguish from informa-
tion. We are living in an “informational abundance,” which also generated (an im-
pression of) “a communicative liquefaction of politics” (Habermas, 2009: 153).
If information overload incites processes of fragmentation and one-directional cog-
nitive consonance (Festinger, 1957), resulting in ‘echo chambers’ or ‘fi lter bubbles,’ 
often spurred by covert algorithms, such as Facebook’s personalized news-feed or 
Google Personalized Search, it reduces opportunities to test the objective validity of 
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our knowledge and opinions, which is the condition of refl exive reasoning. As 
Kant’s maxim of judgment demands, one has “to think from the standpoint of eve-
ryone else,” detached from “the subjective personal conditions of his judgement, 
which cramp the minds of so many others, and refl ects upon his own judgement 
from a universal standpoint” (Kant, 1790/1952: 519). The norm that opinions (and 
reasons thereof) should be publicly available and comprehensible is a constitutive 
characteristic of deliberative democracy (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: 4). Without 
an aptitude to take “the standpoint of everyone else,” a person may become sepa-
rated from relevant information, dissenting opinions and reasons substantiating 
them, and thus not being able of making informed judgements.
Publicy as an online extension of privacy generated by personal modes of publicity 
and potentially connected with a public is a new kind of communicative relationship 
among people enabled by IPPCN. It both connects and separates public and private 
life of individuals in an unprecedented way constitutive of the ‘second universe’. 
Yet this new mode of many-to-many communication does not suffi ce to overcome 
the contemporary democratic defi cit; even the contrary could be the case.
Since democratic decision-making and control require knowledge and basic insights 
into politically relevant processes and outcomes (i.e. those with important long-
term consequences for a signifi cant number of people), a public complement to 
private personalized news-stream algorithms should be developed, to avoid nega-
tive consequences of the commercial use of algorithms diverting users from testing 
the objective validity of their opinions. The possibility of making a major break-
through in this fi eld has become possible thanks to revolutionary computer advanc-
es in natural language processing and machine learning.
In their seminal study of “how do ‘events’ become ‘news’,” Galtung and Ruge 
(1965: 65) identifi ed twelve empirical “news factors” (such as negativity, person-
alization, cultural proximity, reference to elites, confl ict etc.) that were conceived of 
as indicators of “newsworthiness” of events, which warrants reporting on them in a 
newspaper. The conceptualization of newsworthiness followed The New York Times’ 
motto, “All the News That’s Fit to Print”: a content analysis of news reported in 
newspapers was conducted with the assumption that, if an event “becomes” printed 
news, it is newsworthy. Not surprisingly, many other “news factors” were extracted 
in later content analysis of news media in different countries.
By applying a different logic of the facilitating algorithm, we can conceptualize 
“public-worthiness” of events and processes to address the question, what events, 
processes and actors should be (able to be made) visible, and to whom? The public-
worthiness algorithm should offer the internet users information on events and pro-
cesses with potentially important long-term consequences. This new algorithm 
would be the exact opposite to the emerging robot-driven news production and dis-
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semination software targeting users with customized news or generating automated 
news stories about niche or local topics, to be disseminated to many small audi-
ences.
The idea of public-worthiness goes beyond the descriptive concept of newsworthi-
ness, traditionally applied in the studies of news selection in the media, and includes 
four dimensions. Three dimensions of public-worthiness could be directly measured 
with AI tools: (1) news values or factors that determine how much prominence a 
news story or event is given on a global, regional, national or local scale, (2) the 
attention it is given by the internet users (popularity) globally, regionally, nationally, 
or locally, and (3) reliability and trustfulness of news sources, whereas (4) specifi c 
indicators of the “long-term important consequences” of events/processes/transac-
tions reported will need to be manually generated at fi rst but could be later gener-
ated in machine learning procedures. Such an algorithm would provide internet us-
ers with information based on their issue-related interests in the common good, 
rather than on what the so-called recommendation algorithms decide they ‘would 
like’ to see.
The emergence of (proto-) publics generated by the public-worthiness recommen-
dation algorithm in social media would be a breakthrough for worldwide communi-
cation and defragmentation of the public sphere(s). Such a facilitating algorithm 
could stimulate internet users to effectively identify events and processes linking 
them together and thus motivate their public engagement even on a global scale. If 
the emerging online proto-publics will be stimulated to leverage public-worthy pro-
cesses, they could convert themselves into a genuine public – a Deweyan “commu-
nity” assuring that not only opinions are discussed among its members but also 
made visible to those with regulatory power, and thus (potentially) effectual.
It would be a delusion of technological determinism to say that technological possi-
bilities of the internet or even an algorithm alone can introduce such changes. The 
seemingly emancipatory affordances of the internet and Artifi cial Intelligence have 
proved to be controversial at least. Despite an increased permeability between the 
various modes and domains of societal communication, we can hardly speak of de-
mocratization of communication, media and politics. The internetization and globali-
zation of economy generate even a higher level of concentration of the internetized 
media than the traditional print and broadcast media have experienced in the past.
Even if there is an “emancipatory technological potential” in the internet, it is only 
its users as publics who can use new social networking platforms and tools to culti-
vate refl exive publicity and generate an effective public opinion. Which brings us 
back to Dewey’s question of the development of “intellectual instrumentalities,” 
such as social inquiry and publicity, as essential prerequisites “for the formation of 
an organized public.”
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NOTES
1 This is a much elaborated and extended version of my short article “Publicness 
– Privateness: Liquefaction of ‘the Great Dichotomy” published in Javnost – 
The Public, 25(1–2).
2 The term ‘internetization’ was initially coined by Fortunati (2005), although 
Passaris (2006) is usually credited for it.
3 In China, for example, the distinctive characteristics of the concepts, public 
and private, are found in one of the dominant concepts shared by different 
schools of Chinese philosophy, ‘yin-yang.’ Yin, the passive principle in na-
ture, symbolizes among other things what is covert, concealed or hidden, 
whereas its opposite, yang, the active principle, denotes open, overt forces.
4 https://www.slideshare.net/gleonhard/data-is-the-new-oil-publicy-is-the-new-
privacy-futurist-speaker-gerd-leonhard
5 The invention of the term ‘’publicy’’ belongs to Stowe Boyd (2009), who be-
came famous for coining the term “hashtag” in 2007.
6 As expressed by the chief executive offi cer of Sun Microsystems, Scott Mc-
Nealy, see: https://www.wired.com/1999/01/sun-on-privacy-get-over-it/
7 It is indeed unfortunate that, “although Habermas concludes Transformations 
with extensive quotes from Mills’ Power Elite on the metamorphosis of the pub-
lic into a mass in the contemporary media/consumer society, there has been little 
discussion of the signifi cance of Mills’ work for Habermas’ analysis of the struc-
tural transformation of the public sphere” (Kellner, 2014: 25).
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(Re)produkcija javnosti i privatnosti 
u tekućem modernom društvu
Slavko Splichal
SAŽETAK
Internetizacija predstavlja vjerojatno najveću promjenu u komunikacijskoj teh-
nologiji od izuma abecede i pisanja. Prvi puta u povijesti zajednička određenost 
javnost i privatnosti materijalizirana je na jednoj tehnološkoj platformi. Nevi-
đen rast javnih, privatnih i hibridnih načina komuniciranja na internetu i u 
društvenim medijima pokazuje da korištenje interneta može značajno utjecati 
na budućnost javnosti, privatnosti i političkih procesa u cjelini. U ovom članku 
razmatraju se novi modeli odnosa razvijeni u Integriranim javno-privatnim ko-
munikacijskim mrežama (IPPCN), kao što su “privacity” i “publicy”, i nove 
putove za stvaranje publike koja se temelji na IPPCN-u.
Ključne riječi:  internetizacija, javnost, publicy, privatnost, privacity, demokracija, 
IPPCN
